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Abstract
Election fraud is a pervasive feature of autocracies but often only serves lower-tier
officials to cast signals of loyalty or competence to the central government in order
to pursue their own interests. How much such personal interests matter for electoral
fraud under autocracy has however not been studied so far. In this paper, I exploit
a radical policy change in Russia which allowed the president to replace governors of
the country’s 89 regions at his own will. As a result, federal elections after December
2004 were organised by two types of governors: one was handpicked by the president,
the other one elected before the law change and re-appointed. Even though both
types faced removal in case of bad results, the need to signal loyalty was much lower
for the first type. In order to estimate the effect of handpicked governors on electoral
fraud, I use a diff-in-diff framework over 7 federal elections between 2000 and 2012.
For this time period, I use results from about 95,000 voting stations to construct
a new indicator of suspicious votes for each region and election. I show that this
indicator correlates strongly with incidents of reported fraud. My baseline estimates
show that in territories with a handpicked governor the share of suspicious votes
decreased on average by more than 10 percentage points and dropped even further if
the region’s economy had done well over the past legislature. These findings suggest
that governors have less need to use rigging as a signal once loyalty is assured unless
faced with circumstances raising doubts about their competence.
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I think you need to pay attention
to those areas where our people
have denied United Russia serious
trust. Not because it is a tragedy,
but because it is a signal for the
authorities.
Dimitri Medvedev, 2011
1 Introduction
One common explanation for the poor economic performance of autocracies is the
failure to hold leaders accountable for bad policy. While democracies use free and
fair elections in order to punish or reward politicians, the voting process under
dictatorship is often manipulated and seen as a meaningless political ritual. Recent
literature has called this view into question arguing that authoritarian elections are
actually used by the ruling circle to hold officials accountable. Similar to the role
of education in the labour market, elections may be used by subordinates to cast
signals about their loyalty or competence to their superiors (Gandhi and Lust-Okar,
2009). For instance, high results may be rewarded by directing additional resources
under the control of the respective official or by advancing his party career chances
through promotion (Martinez-Bravo, 2014). With legal barriers largely absent, this
creates strong incentives for public officials to artificially change results and engage
in electoral fraud. The extent to which such concerns are driving ballot rigging in
autocracies has, however, remained a largely understudied topic since institutional
setups under dictatorship tend to be rigid, and reliable data on the intensity of fraud
is scarce.
This paper uses detailed data on Federal elections in Russia and a novel tool
for detecting suspicious results to study the effect of a radical policy change in
accountability to the central government. After the 2004 Beslan hostage crisis, which
exposed severe inefficiencies in the local administration, president Putin signed a
law which abolished governor elections in the country’s 89 regions. From December
2004 onwards, regional leaders thus had to be appointed by the president in order
to stay in office after their term but could also be dismissed without any legal
barriers (Hill, 2012). While this gave the central government an important stick
to punish notoriously under-performing and corrupt leaders, it also severely altered
their motivation to please their superiors by delivering the right results in federal
elections which they can organise in their territory at large discretion. The reality of
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this threat can be seen from the low election results of United Russia in December
2011 which resulted in the dismissal or voluntary resignation of 6 governors over the
following 4 months (Chaykovskaya, 2011; Moraski and Reisinger, 2013).
The legal change, however, also started a transition period from 2005 onwards
during which handpicked and elected governors coexisted and organised 4 national
ballots. This allows me to study the differential effect of abolishing governor elec-
tions on two types of leaders: one whose loyalty is assured but uncertainty about
competence may still exist, and another one where neither of these is known (see
also Egorov and Sonin, 2011). In my conceptual framework I argue that, for given
levels competence, appointments may induce lower levels of election fraud since of-
ficials do not need to use rigging as a means to signal their loyalty to the centre. In
a recent paper, Martinez-Bravo (2014) studied the effect of local officials on election
fraud in Indonesia where a democracy inherits a set of potentially not trustworthy
officials from an autocracy. The author demonstrates empirically that appointed
village heads have a higher need to convince their supervisors of their suitability
than elected ones. The mechanism I propose is dealing with the opposite prob-
lem faced by an authoritarian government: until all positions are filled with loyal
party cadres, officials chosen under the previous regime are particularly suspicious
of disloyalty and may therefore try to over-compensate. Moreover, my model claims
that, when facing a bad economic performance, also leaders selected by the central
government may engage in fraud to send a signal about their competence and keep
their position.
In order to empirically test my predictions and study the effect of this policy
change on election fraud, I use unique highly disaggregated data at the voting station
level for all 7 national elections – parliamentary and presidential – held in the Russian
Federation from 2000 to 2012. For each region I calculate the percentage of votes cast
in districts with highly suspicious results. A district’s result is deemed suspicious
if the turnout and vote share regression coefficient (TVSC) takes values greater or
equal to one. The TVSC has been widely used in the study of electoral fraud in the
Russian context and is appropriate for detecting ballot stuffing and other turnout-
inflating types of manipulation (Myagkov et al., 2009). Legitimate doubts about its
reliability and shortcomings are met by a number of tests. First, I show that my
measure is significantly correlated with reported incidents of fraud during the 2011
and 2012 elections and decreases with the introduction of electronic vote scanners
across Russian regions. Second, I benchmark the TVSC against other indicators
using first- and second digit distributions of incumbent vote and valid ballot totals
which do not seem to have similar power in detecting rigging in Russian elections.
3
I quantify the treatment effect of governor selection using a differences-in-differences
estimation which controls for region-specific and election-specific determinants of rig-
ging and the time-varying effect of pre-2000 democratic institutions. Competence of
a governor is measured by an index of regions’ changes in unemployment and GDP
per capita growth over the last legislature of either president of parliament. Both
variables are then aggregated to a single index of economic performance over the
last 4 years. The regression specification includes this index as well as its interaction
with the treatment in order to study the differential response to economic fluctua-
tions across both handpicked and elected governors. The baseline results show that
regions with a handpicked governor obtain on average more than 10% less votes from
districts with highly suspicious results. Second, the negative effect of a handpicked
governor on fraud is even stronger during times of good economic development. Only
under extremely bad conditions does the negative marginal effect of a handpicked
governor disappear completely. I use various checks to address concerns about the
endogeneity of governor replacement such as placebo tests for different time periods
and outcome variables. The coefficients are robust to the inclusion of region-specific
time trends and election fixed effects for each Federal district as well as different def-
initions of economic performance. Furthermore, placebo experiments show no effect
if treatment is moved one or two elections forward and no response on unrelated
election outcomes such as votes for other parties.
Several empirical studies have investigated the fate of Russia’s governors after
2005 but mainly focussed on the selection mechanism (Reuter and Robertson, 2012;
Moraski and Reisinger, 2013) or outcomes other than election fraud (Moraski and
Reisinger, 2009; Rochlitz, 2013)1. Kalinin and Mebane (2011) are studying how
federal transfers affected election fraud in the 1990s and 2000s using a number based
approach and aggregated data. I contribute to this literature by linking the incentive
structures of governors after December 2004 to changes in election fraud over time.
The TVSC method for detecting fraud used in this study has furthermore been used
in various papers on the Russian context (Filippov and Ordeshook, 1997; Myagkov
et al., 2009; Lukinova et al., 2011; Enikolopov et al., 2013), yet so far without a
systematic application over all regions and several elections. My paper adds to this
work by providing further evidence on the TVSC’s ability to capture fraud and by
making it usable for cross-regional comparison over time. Studies of fraud have been
carried out for other countries using different indicators of ballot rigging. Examples
of these are Ziblatt (2009) for Imperial Germany, Ichino and Schu¨ndeln (2012) for
Ghana, and Cantu and Saiegh (2011) for Argentina. With the exception of Ziblatt
1 See Rochlitz (2013) for further references on this topic.
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(2009), my work is one of few papers studying the evolution of electoral fraud over
time. In terms of the studied mechanism, the closest piece of work is the previously
mentioned study by Martinez-Bravo (2014) who looks at the topic from the side of
a democracy and proxies election fraud through high votes for the dominating party
instead of a direct indicator of rigging.
The paper starts with description of important institutional details and the con-
ceptual framework used to analyse the changing incentive structures of election fraud
in Russia. After briefly describing the data used, I present the main fraud indica-
tor with a special emphasis on its reliability and comparison with other potential
alternatives. Next, I outline the differences-in-differences approach used in the em-
pirical analysis and discuss the validity of its assumptions in the studied context.
The baseline results are presented in the subsequent section which is followed by
robustness checks and placebo tests. The last section concludes.
2 Institutional and theoretical background
2.1 Relevant aspects of Russia’s political system
As in any presidential system, the president is paramount in Russia’s constitution.
He appoints the government as well as the members of the constitutional court and
the supreme court. In addition, he has the right to veto laws passed by the legislative
and can also initiate laws himself (Chaisty, 2012). Moreover, he can dissolve the
State Duma under extreme circumstances, rule by decrees without consent of the
parliament and call for an emergency state which gives him the power to even
ignore civil freedoms. The president is chosen in national elections and the length of
term has recently been extended from four to six years from 2012 onwards (Sakwa,
2008). The legislature of the Russian Federation consists of two chambers - the
State Duma and the Federal Council. The main task of the Federal Council is to
represent the Russian regions. It has 178 members, with two representatives for
each administrative unit. Representatives are appointed by the regional executive
and the regional parliament and can be withdrawn by these institutions. The State
Duma’s 450 members, in turn, are elected through a national ballot. Until 2007, half
of the deputies were elected by majority in single-member districts and the other
half proportionally through party lists. This system was, however, abandoned in
favour of a purely proportional representation. Like the president, both chambers
have the power to initiate new laws (Sakwa, 2008).
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As in most federal states, each subdivision has its own legislative and execu-
tive. Each Russian region is headed by a governor.2 The members of the regional
assemblies are chosen in local elections. Similar to the national level, these assem-
blies are dominated by the executive making governors the most important political
institution in the regions. From 1996 until December 2004 they were chosen in lo-
cal elections. However, in 2004 the constitution was changed in favour of a direct
appointment of governors by the president (Slider, 2012). This drastic constitu-
tional change was decided in the aftermath of the Beslan Massacre. On the 1st of
September 2004, a multinational terror squad took over 1000 hostages in a school
in Beslan, a town in the Republic North Ossetia-Alania close to Chechnya. When
security forces attempted to free the hostages, more than 300 people were killed.
This national tragedy demonstrated the increased power of Chechen insurgents
and their allies but also showed the lack of coordination between federal and re-
gional authorities.3 Very soon after the attacks, president Vladimir Putin initiated
a law which re-introduced the appointment of governors. The draft passed both
chambers of the Federal Assembly and came into effect in December 2004. What
may seem puzzling is that the new law was accepted by both the population and the
governors without any major opposition. Goode (2007), who analysed the parlia-
mentary debates in late 2004, concludes that a combination of rally-around-the-flag
effects and an appeal to Soviet legacies made it impossible to reject the new law.
Additionally, being independent of the local electorate and depending only on the
central executive was in the interest of many governors.
2.2 Conceptual framework
Election fraud in this paper is perceived as the result of an interaction between the
president P and a governor. The latter can be of two types, either elected (GE)
or handpicked (GH). Governors organise national elections in which P runs for
office and can exert fraud in order to influence the results in P ’s favour. P ’s stay
in power is assumed not to depend on the election outcome but he cares about
the governor’s competence C and loyalty L.4 Competence is appreciated by P
for reasons uncorrelated with election outcomes such as international reputation or
development assistance. In line with Egorov and Sonin (2011) I assume, however,
2 Many regions use different titles such as President, Head of the Republic, or Head of the admin-
istration. For the sake of simplicity, I refer to all these in this paper simply as governors.
3 This was apparent even though a lot of information about the Beslan hostage crisis was actually
withheld from the Russian public (Haraszti, 2004).
4 One could imagine, for instance, that centralised state propaganda ensures high levels of political
support for the incumbent.
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that Lmatters far more than C for P . While L is known by P , he uses election results
to infer the competence Cˆ. The interaction between P and G can be separated into
two phases. In the first one, GE is elected by popular vote and therefore L is
unknown. For simplicity, I assume that LE is 0. Since fraud is a costly action and
P cannot hold GE accountable, there is no fraud in this phase.
In the second phase, P is now equipped with the power to remove an elected
governor GE . P ’s decision is based on whether it is more beneficial to select a
new governor GH from his cadres who is loyal with probability 1 but of uncertain
competence. This decision is based on evaluating the last election results. For sim-
plification, I make the strong assumption that P is not well informed about voters’
decision making process. In fact, he interprets his vote share as a linearly increasing
function of Cˆ. Governors can, however, exert fraud in order to artificially increase
the result and influence P ’s conclusion about Cˆ. P ’s decision about keeping or dis-
missing governors depends on how their loyalty and competence compares with that
of a handpicked new governor. If Cˆ is below of the minimum required competence
Cˆmin, he will be removed. As a result, minimum competence levels will vary by
type such that Cˆmin
E
> Cˆmin
S
. Hence, the only way for GE to compensate his lack
of loyalty and stay in office is through artificially increasing Cˆ by means of electoral
fraud which motivates the first hypothesis.
Hypothesis 1: For given levels of competence, handpicked governors will en-
gage in less rigging than elected ones.
The second difference between the two types of governors is the way they are
evaluated by the electorate. Unlike his elected counterpart, GH knows that his own
economic performance has an influence on votes for P . The reason for this is, that
voters may want to punish or reward P for his choice of governor.5 Assuming that
economic performance is stochastic and independent of C to some degree, it follows
that if a handpicked governor does a bad job, he is more likely to be fired. This is
because P will infer a lower quality, unless GH compensates this through rigging.
Vice versa, a good performance allows him to reduce the amount of fraud even fur-
ther. The second hypothesis therefore goes as follows:
5 That such behaviour is actually at work is well exemplified in the study by Szakonyi (2012) who
investigates the political reactions to the wildfires in Russia in 2010.
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Hypothesis 2: Handpicked governors will engage in less rigging if they per-
formed well during the last election period.
Having presented the main hypotheses to be tested in this paper, I now proceed
to discuss my measure of election fraud used in the empirical analysis.
3 Measuring election fraud
3.1 The turnout/vote share correlation
The turnout/vote share indicator was first applied by Sobyanin for the 1993 consti-
tutional referendum and is probably the most widely used tool for detecting election
rigging in Russia. It is most suited for turnout-inflating cases of fraud and relies
on the assumption that within a given entity and absent manipulation there should
be no correlation between how many people vote and their choice across lower-tier
areas. Figure 1 illustrates this with a brief example similar to Myagkov et al. (2009):
there are 24 voting stations in an area with a given homogenous support of 75% for
candidate i. Half of the stations are in high-turnout areas where 60% of the elec-
torate casts their ballot, whereas the remaining ones only have a turnout of 40%.
Absent fraud, a 1% higher turnout T is associated with an increase of 0.75% in
votes for i out of the total electorate, V/E. A simple OLS regression thus yields a
turnout/vote-share coefficient (henceforth TVSC ) equal to the average support of
the candidate. This relation, however, would not hold in the case of ballot stuffing
or other turnout inflating methods of manipulating the outcome as can be seen from
the right panel in figure 1. In this scenario eight of the formerly low-turnout stations
see their turnout artificially increased with all additional votes going to candidate
i. The TVSC thus changes from 0.75 to 1.07 which cannot be equal to i’s natural
support in that area anymore.6
Following Myagkov et al. (2009), one can distinguish between the cases when 1)
the TVSC exceeds the candidates vote share in the respective area but is smaller
than one and 2) the TVSC is bigger or equal to one. In the first scenario, the
conclusion is ambiguous and will only be a safe detector if one can rule out that the
favoured candidate – absent fraud – would have fared particularly well in lower-tier
areas of high turnout – a premise which is quite difficult to check. TVSC ≥ 1 appears
6 One could imagine a scenario in which fraud is conducted in such a way that turnout and vote
share are identical in each voting station. In this case there would be no variation and a TVSC
could not be calculated. While this is theoretically possible, it is very difficult to implement in
reality. I did not encounter such a case during the construction of my fraud data.
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Figure 1: Example of TVSC absent fraud (left) and present (right)
to be a stronger indicator of manipulative turnout inflation, but it is also prone to
fallacies as depicted in figure 2. One may think of a region with uniform support
of 75% for candidate i across its three districts with 4, 12, and 8 voting stations
respectively. The voting stations, however, are not homogeneous since districts differ
substantially in their average turnout level. A regression of V/E on T across the
whole region will thus suffer from aggregation bias and yield a TVSC larger than
one even though fraud did not take place. While this error cannot be ruled out
entirely, it can be mitigated by using highly disaggregated data and calculating the
TVSC for reasonably homogeneous areas. Enikolopov et al. (2013), for instance,
have shown that the random allocation of election observers across voting stations
in the city of Moscow during the 2011 Duma election significantly decreased the
TVSC calculated for the United Russia party.
Further estimates of election fraud in Russia’s regions using the TVSC have been
scarce so far and mostly relied on district aggregates (e.g. Myagkov et al., 2009).
In these cases the assumption of homogeneity is difficult to defend and the amount
of districts/observations may be very low.7 The availability of election results at
the voting stations level since 2000 allow me to calculate TVSCs in each district of
a given region (e.g. Lukinova et al., 2011) and to construct new and more robust
estimates of election rigging across Russia’s regions. As a new measure of regional
fraud intensity, I propose the share of votes from districts with a TVSC ≥ 1. This
indicator has the main advantage of using data from comparatively small areas such
7 The city of Moscow, for instance, has 130 TIKs while the Nenets Autonomous Okrug has only
three.
9
00.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
b b
b bb b
b b
b b
b bb b
b bb b
b b
b b
b b
Votes/Electorate
V/E = -1.75 + 1.07T
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
b b
b bb b
b b
b b
b bb b
b bb b
b b
b b
b b
Turnout
V/E = 1.125 + 0.75T
V/E = 0.75T
V/E = 0.75T
Figure 2: Example of biased TVSC in the case of non-homogeneous areas
as districts but simultaneously provides a regional aggregate from this information.
It is supposed to capture the intensity of rigging rather than its mere existence
which has been observed in virtually every region across the country and therefore
does not provide much information. Another interpretation of the indicator is the
percentage of votes likely to be affected by manipulation or, simply, the suspicious
vote share.
The choice of this indicator appears arbitrary at first and one may think of
several alternatives: the first option could be to deem a district’s votes suspicious
if the TVSC exceeds the candidate’s vote share and calculate the suspicious vote
share based on this rule. Alternatively, one could estimate a single region-specific
TVSC from all voting stations and calculate either a dummy for whether it exceeds
one or obtain the continuous difference from the candidate’s actual vote share. The
following section compares the proposed indicator of fraud to these alternatives in
terms of reliability and provides further checks of its validity.
3.2 Reliability and validity checks
Before proceeding with a specific indicator of election fraud, one needs to assure
that it is reliable and valid. Verifying reliability beyond anecdotal evidence is par-
ticularly difficult in the context of election rigging since officials usually try to hide
their actions. I tackle this issue with fraud report data from the NGO GOLOS
(Russian for vote or voice). This provides information on the region where election
irregularities were witnessed. Subsequently, one can form a regional measure and
10
Table 1: Reported irregularities 2011-2012 and fraud indicators based on TVSC
Reports per 100k electorate Effect of TVSC based on
vote share, with TVSC regional aggregate, with TVSC
≥ 1 ≥ Incumbent
vote
≥ 1 ≥ Incumbent
vote
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Improper counting 0.547∗∗∗ 0.224 0.130 −0.028
(0.194) (0.214) (0.112) (0.118)
Exclusion of voters 0.193∗ 0.234 −0.042 −0.076
(0.113) (0.161) (0.134) (0.185)
Illegal campaigning 0.036 0.019 0.102 0.096
(0.084) (0.158) (0.107) (0.101)
Observers excluded 0.567∗∗ 0.453 0.176 0.070
(0.265) (0.333) (0.169) (0.200)
Faulty ballot box 0.056 −0.129 −0.039 −0.108
(0.142) (0.297) (0.124) (0.124)
Secrecy violated 0.169∗∗ 0.104 0.086 0.079
(0.066) (0.092) (0.054) (0.057)
Illegal voting 0.216 0.426 0.050 0.100
(0.228) (0.347) (0.165) (0.191)
Other violations 0.872∗∗ 0.497 0.283 0.249
(0.398) (0.564) (0.319) (0.373)
Election FE Y Y Y Y
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the region level in parantheses, ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01;
Controls: % Population with internet access; UR members per cap.
relate it to various types of election rigging for each subdivision. Table 1 presents
the 32 coefficients from regressing the amount of each 8 types of election irregularity
on 4 variants of the TVSC measure presented in the preceding section. In addition
to that, the regressions also control for election specific trends and the incumbent
party’s strength proxied by party members per capita. The latter ensures validity of
the TVSC which could also be driven by a party’s advantages in mobilising voters
and in turn increase the likelihood of reporting irregularities out of revenge. Finally,
since fraud reports are likely to be incomplete and affected by technical impediments
such as the lack of internet access, I also include the percentage of households with
internet access into the regressions.
The results indicate that only the regional vote share of districts with a TVSC
exceeding 1 is reliable. Most notably, it is strongly correlated with reports on those
irregularities associated with fraud such as improper counting and exclusion of ob-
servers. Also other violations like exclusion of voters, violation of secrecy, and other
violations seem to be correlated with the first indicator. The measure in column
2 produces similar but far less precise estimates. Indicators 3 and 4 which assume
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Table 2: High TVSC and introduction of electronic ballot boxes, 2000-2012
Vote share with TVSC ≥ 1
(1) (2) (3) (4)
% Electronic ballot boxes 0.352 −0.685∗∗ −0.365∗∗∗ −0.366∗∗∗
(0.263) (0.296) (0.117) (0.115)
County FE N N Y Y
Election FE N Y Y Y
Controls N N N Y
Counties 71 71 71 71
Observations 497 497 497 497
R2 0.003 0.105 0.762 0.762
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the region level in parantheses, ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01;
Controls: log(GDP per capita)
a uniform distribution of fraud are only weakly and sometimes even negatively af-
fecting the detection of irregularities. This makes the vote share of districts with a
TVSC exceeding 1 the prime candidate for detecting election fraud in the Russian
context. The inclusion of United Russia members per capita furthermore ensures
reliability and that the results are not driven by other potential correlates of the
TVSC.
Another desirable property for a good detector of rigging intensity is that it co-
moves with the opportunities for falsifying results. A significant decrease in such
opportunities was marked by the start of electronic vote counting via optical scanners
(KOIB) during the mid-2000s across Russia in about 5% of all voting stations. The
introduction was staggered starting with the 2007 Duma elections which makes it
unlikely to be correlated with other incentives for fraud. From official government
documents I collected information on the numbers of KOIBs in each region across
federal elections and calculated the percentage of voting stations equipped with such
a device. Table 2 shows the results from regressing the vote share with TVSC≥ 1
on the share of regions’ voting stations equipped with a KOIB over the time period
2000 to 2012. Once election and region fixed effects are controlled for, one can see
that having 1% more stations with electronic ballot boxes in a region reduces the
share of votes from suspicious districts by 0.3%. The results of this test suggest
again that the indicator is reliable and valid.
Admittedly, the share of suspicious votes based on TVSC≥ 1 is not a perfect
measure of rigging intensity but the findings above suggest that it is strongly cor-
related with what it is supposed to measure and that many potential concerns can
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be ruled out. Unfortunately, there is no way to look at fraud reports before 2011
so some warranted doubt may still remain. In the following section I briefly present
other indicators common in the analysis of rigged elections and check their explana-
tory strength in the case of Russia 2000 to 2012.
3.3 Alternative indicators
The preceding chapters have solely investigated quantitative tools for detecting
turnout inflating types of rigging and the vast amount of evidence indeed points
in the direction of this being the most widely used technique of manipulating the re-
sults in favour of a specific candidate (Filippov and Ordeshook, 1997; White, 2011;
Enikolopov et al., 2013). Yet, anecdotal evidence from the Russian republics –
Tatarstan, Ingushetia and Dagestan in particular – suggests that election results in
some areas may not only be manipulated but entirely fabricated (Myagkov et al.,
2009; Lukinova et al., 2011). In detecting this kind of fraud I follow the methodol-
ogy of Beber and Scacco (2012) who rely on human preferences for specific numbers
and biases in number generation. The main argument is that, under fairly generous
assumptions, the final digit as well as the distance between the last and second-
last digit of the vote count should follow a uniform distribution. In order to create
alternative indicators of the share of suspicious votes, I adapt the methodology of
Beber and Scacco to identify fraud at the district level and then aggregate this to
the regional level using the share of affected votes as for the TVSC. In detail, I
proceeded as follows: first, I calculated for each district the p-values of a Pearson’s
chi-squared test of uniform distribution of the last digit and the distance between
last and second-last digits and repeated this procedure for both the reported valid
votes as well as incumbent votes. In a second step, I obtained the share of votes
in each region from districts where the hypothesis of uniform distribution could be
rejected at a significance level of either 5 or 1%. This procedure has the advantage of
being completely agnostic about the kind of bias, i.e. whether there is a bias towards
fives in one district vs. eights in another, and only assumes whether votes for the
incumbent or the number of valid votes/turnout were affected. The measures are
furthermore also formed as ratios and therefore easily comparable to the indicators
of suspicious votes presented above.
Table 3 repeats the analyses of table 1 for each of the 8 measures of fabricated
votes. Interestingly, none of them has a significant positive effect on any reported
election irregularity. If anything, some kinds of reports per capita are negatively
affected by the share of votes from districts with numeric anomalies. Unusual digit
distributions in the incumbent votes, for example, are associated with less reports on
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Table 3: Reported irregularities 2011-2012 and numeric anomalies
Reports per 100k electorate Effect of vote share with numeric anomalies for
Valid votes Incumbent votes
last digit, with p ≤ ∆ last 2 digits, with p ≤ last digit, with p ≤ ∆ last 2 digits, with p ≤
0.05 0.01 0.05 0.01 0.05 0.01 0.05 0.01
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Improper counting −0.303 0.379 0.305 0.388 −0.373 −0.489 0.625 −0.071
(0.377) (1.874) (0.642) (0.899) (0.373) (1.035) (0.937) (0.902)
Exclusion of voters −0.295 3.647 2.136 −0.619 −0.274 −0.296 1.217 0.526
(0.396) (2.999) (1.903) (0.622) (0.240) (0.873) (0.880) (0.921)
Illegal campaigning 0.608 0.747 1.272 0.484 −0.473∗ −0.147 −0.308 −0.045
(0.525) (1.276) (0.947) (1.140) (0.258) (0.839) (0.403) (0.520)
Observers excluded 0.002 3.157 −0.438 −0.788 −0.709 −0.351 1.570 −1.486
(0.727) (3.529) (0.841) (1.045) (0.766) (2.321) (1.343) (1.267)
Faulty ballot box 1.003 4.475 0.568 −0.890∗ −0.969∗∗ −0.918 −1.157∗ −0.721
(0.748) (4.023) (0.905) (0.539) (0.429) (0.778) (0.643) (0.764)
Secrecy violated −0.152 1.250 0.042 −0.505∗ −0.072 0.053 0.360 0.257
(0.178) (1.252) (0.215) (0.300) (0.145) (0.461) (0.340) (0.423)
Illegal voting 0.653 12.040 0.300 −1.161 −1.254∗ −0.757 0.404 0.055
(1.078) (8.138) (0.922) (0.711) (0.675) (1.249) (1.165) (2.180)
Other violations 2.057 15.814 1.201 −1.218 −0.543 −0.492 0.439 0.610
(1.935) (12.250) (1.748) (1.446) (1.050) (1.837) (1.655) (1.943)
Election FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the region level in parantheses, ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01; Controls: % Population with internet access
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illegal campaigning, faulty ballot boxes, and illegal voting. Anomalies in the distance
between the last two digits in the number of valid votes, on the other hand, signifi-
cantly reduces also reports on faulty ballot boxes as well as the violation of secrecy.
In particular, it does not seem to be correlated with exclusion of observers. One
possible interpretation of these results is that fabricating votes may be a complement
to turnout inflating methods which does apparently not require actions observable
to the public and hence results in lower amounts of reported fraud. Voters’ inability
to detect and report entirely invented results makes it hard to verify the reliability
of any fraud indicator built on numeric anomalies. The results in table 3 should
thus also be regarded as a reminder that some fraud may still not be detected by
the fraud indicator used in the remainder of this paper. Bearing this caveat in mind,
I now turn towards the extent of potentially fraudulent election outcomes and its
changes over time.
3.4 The evolution of suspicious results 2000–2012
Figure 3 plots for each election the share of votes with TVSC≥ 1 in each Russian
region. This helps understanding the variation in the main outcome variable and
at the same time also shows how rigging changed at the extensive margin over
the time period studied. While always present to some degree in few subdivisions,
suspicious results started to take off during the March 2004 Presidential election
from an average of 8 to 20%. During the 2007 Duma election it kept on rising to
about 24-25% and remained roughly stable onwards. The distribution is skewed to
the left resulting in median values below the corresponding means. Since the year
2003, however, also these gaps have been widening from 5 to about 10 percentage
points indicating that intensity has surged disproportionately at the right tail.
Figure 4 zooms into the district level measures of rigging for the two elections
before and after 2005. The plotted variable is a dummy whether the TVSC is exceed-
ing unity in a given district and visualises how fraud evolved at the intensive margin
across the Russian Federation. Already in 2003 suspicious districts are strongly
concentrated in particular regions, most notably in the Republics of Tatarstan and
Mordovia in Western Russia. In the March 2004 election suspicious votes start
showing up in a number of formerly clean areas and additionally further regions
start showing almost uniformly ballot counts with a TVSC≥ 1 – Republics of Tuva
in South-Central and Bashkortostan in the South-West. Other areas, particularly
in the West and conflict-ridden South-Western Causcasus territory, are joining in
during the next round of elections 2007/2008. This extreme concentration suggests
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that time and region-specific characterstics could indeed be an important driver of
prolific fraudulent election outcomes since 2000.
4 Data
4.1 Elections and fraud reports
The organisation of federal elections in Russia is roughly corresponding to its ad-
ministrative divisions, both horizontally and vertically. The highest authority is
the Central Election Commission (CIK), a permanent body whose members are
nominated by the president, the second chamber Council of Regions and the Duma
parliament. The CIK’s main tasks are the coordination of the 83 Regional Election
Commissions (IKS) and the organisation of the Federal elections. The IKS fulfils
the same role as the CIK at the regional level and coordinates the territorial election
commissions (TIKs). Unlike the CIK, its members are appointed by recommenda-
tion of the Federal government. The next administrative level below the region is
the district (rayon). Like regions, the districts can vary considerably in size and
population but unlike the former there may be several TIKs within the same rayon.
This is especially often the case in larger cities or former closed towns. Over the
period studied there were almost 3,000 TIKs. The members of these are permanent
delegates by the regional executive, legislative and parties. The TIKs are therefore
the level of electoral administration where the long arm of the central government
starts to lose its power. At the lowest level, about 95,000 precinct election com-
missions (UIKs) are responsible for the local organisation of all elections and, most
importantly, the vote counting. Unlike the other commissions, they are only formed
one month before the elections and are nominated by the electorate. It remains
unclear to what extent authorities can still exert control over the composition of the
UIKs but their ad-hoc nature makes them unlikely to be the driving force behind
organised large-scale fraud (OSCE, 2000, 2004a,b, 2012a,b).
All voting data used in this project comes from the organisation GOLOS, an
independent Russian NGO concerned with election monitoring. The data covers
each of presidential and parliamentary election since 2000 and reports results in
absolute terms at the UIK level for the entire Russian Federation. The dataset also
features official numbers on the electorate as well as valid and invalid votes required
to calculate turnout in each precinct. I matched the results at the district/TIK level
which is the main unit of observation in calculating the measures of electoral fraud
explained in section 3. From GOLOS I also obtained direct indicators of election
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Figure 3: Share of suspicious votes before/after the abolition of governor elec-
tions in December 2004
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rigging. During the 2011 and 2012 elections, the association ran the karta narusheniy
(map of violations) project which provided a platform for citizens to anonymously
report incidents of fraud in federal, regional, and local elections and send detailed
reports of observed electoral law violations via phone, internet, and text message. In
addition to that, the users could also give information whether the action happened
during campaigning or on election day and which type of fraud had taken place. Of
particular interest for this research project are the categories distortion of results
and exclusion of observers, committee members, or media. Lastly, the observers
could also provide information on the location where the action was witnessed. I
used this information to match each violations reports to a specific district which
was possible for about 80% of all 12,800 reports (Duma 2011: 6,200/7,800; President
2012: 4,000/5,000). The analysis also draws on a number of other variables which
are explained in the following.
4.2 Socio-economic data, further variables, and sample
According to reports, the main goal of the central government apart from delivering
high vote results and legitimacy is the maintaining of social and economic stabil-
ity. What is far less clear, however, is how such stability is evaluated by Russia’s
leadership. Obvious indicators relate to the economic performance of a region, es-
pecially those also related to the well-being of the population. I therefore obtained
panel data from the Russian Federal State Statistics Service (GKS) on regions’ log
GDP per capita and unemployment rate. Assuming that governors are inferring the
electorate’s support for the incumbent party and presidential candidate based on
their economic performance over the term time, I calculate 4-year changes in both
variables. In order to get a single indicator of economic prosperity, the changes
are then aggregated to a single index using principal component analysis. In order
to assess the index’ validity as a proxy for political support, I use data from the
Public Opinion Foundation compiled in Reuter and Robertson (2012). This yearly
measure is the % of survey respondents in 68 Russian regions answering positively
to the question whether their governor is doing a good job or not. From figure 5
one can see that the index is positively correlated with approval of a region’s head.
A simple OLS regression with region clustered errors and region fixed effects yields
a positive and significant coefficient with a t-statistic of 5.4. Finally, in section 3 I
make use of panel data on regions’ population with internet access which was also
obtained from GKS.
The switch from an elected governor to a handpicked governor is coded in the
main treatment variableHandpickedGovernorit. It has value 1 if the governor ruling
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Figure 5: Economic performance and governor popularity
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region i at time t started his term after the 12th of December 2004 – and therefore
had to be selected by the Russian president – or 0 otherwise. The precise dates
of when a region’s head entered office were retrieved from the website rulers.org.
Another important piece of information are numbers on the members of the ruling
party United Russia by region. This information was gathered from reports of
Russian Federal Ministry of Justice for the years 2009 until 2012 and turned into a
per capita measure using yearly population counts at the region level from GKS.
The final panel dataset covers 71 out Russia’s 83 regions over all 7 federal elec-
tions during the period 2000 to 2012. During this time there were 5 mergers between
2 or 3 regions which reduced the initial amount of 89 subdivisions to 83. Such merg-
ers are likely to fundamentally change the power structure of a governor and make
it difficult to compare the new units especially since all mergers took place after the
abolishment of governor elections. For this reason I excluded all 10 regions affected
by a merger. In addition to that, Chechnya lacked information on economic out-
comes until the early 2000s and the Republic of Sakha didn’t provide precinct-level
voting data in 2000. Both regions were hence dropped from the dataset. Summary
statistics of the final sample are reported in table 4.
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Table 4: Descriptive statistics
Variable Obs Mean Std.Dev. Min Max
Share of ballot w/ TVSC≥1 497 0.21 0.24 0.00 1.00
% Incumbent vote 497 0.59 0.16 0.25 0.99
% Turnout 497 0.65 0.11 0.44 0.98
Electorate in 100,000 497 13.60 12.35 0.34 73.10
Reports per 100k electorate on...
Improper counting 142 0.36 0.49 0.00 2.56
Exclusion of voters 142 0.26 0.58 0.00 6.31
Illegal cmapaigning 142 0.12 0.32 0.00 2.92
Observers excluded 142 0.55 0.79 0.00 5.07
Faulty ballot box 142 0.24 0.42 0.00 2.92
Secrecy violated 142 0.12 0.16 0.00 0.93
Illegal voting 142 0.45 0.72 0.00 5.59
Other violations 142 0.87 1.11 0.00 8.86
% Pop. w/ internet 142 0.41 0.14 0.01 0.72
United Russia members p.c. 142 16.47 8.95 5.61 53.45
Handpicked governor 497 0.30 0.46 0 1
Handpicked governor b/w 2004/2007 497 0.34 0.47 0 1
Population in 100,000 497 17.99 17.17 0.51 118.43
4-year ∆ Economy 497 0.02 1.14 −2.56 4.06
log(GDP p.c.) 497 11.37 0.91 8.75 14.06
4-year ∆ log(GDP p.c.) 497 0.86 0.29 0.17 1.67
Unemployment rate 497 0.09 0.06 0.01 0.57
4-year ∆ Unemployment rate 497 −0.02 0.04 −0.18 0.12
Notes: The unit of observation is one of the 71 regions in the sample at election t. Non-voting
data available over several periods is linearly interpolated to the time of the election. Variables
provided at the cross-sectional level only (i.e. with only 71 observations) are reported accordingly
and used in the analysis by interacting them with either a post-2004 dummy or election fixed
effects.
5 Empirical analysis
5.1 Identification
The main predictions of section 2.2 are that handpicked governors 1) have in general
less incentives to rig elections since loyalty is assured and 2) they use rigging to
compensate expected lower election results. One would therefore expect that in
regions who had a handpicked governor, overall fraud levels decrease but that social
instability could drive them up again. I model this mechanism in a difference-in-
differences specification analysing the changing effect of economic performance on
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the extent of election fraud. The treatment in this setup is the forced change to a
governor chosen by the central administration:
ShareSuspiciousit = α + γi + λt + µX it
+ β HandpickedGovernorit + µ∆Economyit
+ θ HandpickedGovernorit ×∆Economyit + ǫit
(1)
The addition of election-specific and region fixed effects λt and γi restricts the
focus only to variation in suspicious votes within regions off any election specific
trend. Election FEs account for the strong upward shift in suspicious votes over
time that is by construction correlated with the arrival of handpicked governors af-
ter 2005. Area-specific fixed effects further control for permanently strong political
machines originating from times of the Soviet Union (Hale, 2003). Further con-
trols X it are including regions’ aggregate democracy rating between 1991 and 2001
interacted with election fixed effects. The standard errors are clustered at the re-
gion level to account for autocorrelation of region-specific unobservables which may
downward bias conventional robust estimates of the residuals’ variance. In order to
consistently estimate the effect of having a handpicked governor and its interaction
with economic performance on the share of suspicious votes, one needs to assure
that treated regions did not systematically differ from non-treated ones and that re-
placement is not correlated with other simultaneous changes in the respective areas.
The first assumption is casually checked in figure 6 which displays the mean share
of potentially fraudulent votes over time for regions with and without a replacement
of governor between 2004 and 2008. As can be seen, the two groups follow roughly
similar trends before the new law, even during the first major increase of suspicious
votes in the presidential elections of March 2004. In the following elections, the
patterns start diverging with not replaced regions displaying notably higher levels of
suspicious votes. After an initial peak in 2008 with a difference in averages of 10%,
replaced regions remain about 5% below the level of their counterparts.
Unlike the common trends assumption, the absence of confounding events is
not straightforward to check. Replacing a region’s leader may not only mean a
change in loyalty but also in many other factors potentially correlated with rigging
incentives. Two such confounders may be that the central government was targeting
either particularly unpopular governors or particularly unsuccessful ones. Despite
lacking pre-treatment data, figure 7 gives the hint that, if anything, handpicked
governors were less popular than elected ones at the beginning but caught up over
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Figure 6: Average suspicious vote share before/after introduction of governor
appointments
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Figure 7: Average popularity of governors
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Figure 8: Average incumbent vote share before/after introduction of governor
appointments
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Figure 9: Average yearly GDP p.c. growth before/after introduction of gover-
nor appointments
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time. Given this, one would expect that handpicked governors were to engage in
more fraud than old ones since their popularity does not allow them to turn voters
in favour of the central government. Figure 8 also highlights that incumbent votes
in federal elections were at a similar level and that replacement does not appear to
have been a punishment for pre-2005 election results. The fact that incumbent votes
do not respond to replacement after 2005 is striking at first but is not informative
about governors’ popularity given the changing intensity of fraud used to produce
those results. A more reliable check whether success was a selection criterion or
a confounder is provided in figure 9 which compares the average yearly growth in
regional GDP per capita across the two subgroups. Again, there is no evidence for
substantial differences across regions before and after the appointment of governors.
It does not appear that a new region’s head spurred economic growth which could
have led to lower need to rig federal elections.
5.2 Baseline results
Table 5 reports the main results of the difference-in-differences estimation. As can
be seen from the first 2 columns, HandpickedGovernor is positively correlated with
potentially fraudulent elections even when controlling for time-invariant regional
characteristics. This, however, is due to the general rise in replaced governors and
fraud over time which leads to a notable upward bias. Once election fixed effects are
accounted for in column 3 the coefficient flips sign but remains highly significant.
According to the estimates, having a handpicked governor reduces suspicious votes
by 8.5%. This is even larger than the 5% difference observed in the raw data
in figure 6 and equivalent to a third of a standard deviation or moving from the
median to the 25th percentile of the distribution. The result tentatively confirms
the theoretical prediction that if the government selects its own candidate, the need
to signal his loyalty by rigging elections is substantially diminished.
The coefficient remains virtually unaffected by the inclusion of control variables
and 4-year economic performance in the next two specifications. Especially column
5 is reassuring that replacement is not endogenous to a leader’s performance and
that socio-economic development prior to the election has on average no effect on
suspicious votes. The final specification allows this effect to differ for regions with a
handpicked governor and shows that in this case, economic performance significantly
lowers the share of suspicious votes in federal elections. In other words, the negative
correlation between having an appointed governor and potentially fraudulent votes
turns even more negative when the economy has done well over the last four years.
Given that the minimum value of 4-year ∆ Economy is -2.56, handpicked governors
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Table 5: Difference-in-Differences Results
Share of suspicious votes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Handpicked Governor 0.037 0.064∗∗∗−0.086∗∗∗−0.086∗∗∗−0.086∗∗∗−0.108∗∗∗
(0.027) (0.017) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.029)
4-year ∆ Economy 0.005 0.016
(0.013) (0.014)
Handpicked Governor × 4-year ∆ Economy −0.047∗∗
(0.021)
Region FE N Y Y Y Y Y
Election FE N N Y Y Y Y
Controls N N N Y Y Y
Regions 71 71 71 71 71 71
Observations 497 497 497 497 497 497
R2 0.005 0.674 0.770 0.787 0.787 0.790
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the region level in parantheses, ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01;
Controls: Democracy1991−2001 × Election FE
deliver similarly suspicious results only when the region’s economic development was
extremely bad. This finding is consistent with hypothesis 2 in section 2.2 that even
selected officials may use rigging to signal competence in the absence of political
success.
5.3 Sensitivity and robustness checks
As a first test for the stability of the baseline estimates, I re-estimate the orig-
inal model including additional fixed effect specifications. The two setups I am
using are time shifters for each of the 8 Federal Districts and region-specific linear
time trends. Despite looking similar at first, their inclusion serves different pur-
poses. Federal Districts were created in 2000 by President Putin as an intermediary
subdivision between the federal government and the regions and cover between 6
to 18 of these. The corresponding plenipotentiaries are directly appointed by the
president and were used to tighten control over territories’ leaders (Hill, 2012). A
particularly ambitious district leader could therefore replace corrupt governors and
simultaneously disincentivise ballot rigging or introduce manipulation techniques
that the TVSC cannot capture which would give similar results to the ones in
section 5.2. Region-specific linear time trends, on the other hand, provide a test
whether the effect could be driven by diverging trends in fraud between treated and
non-treated regardless of governor replacements. Table 6 depicts the baseline esti-
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Table 6: Baseline results and different FE specifications
Share of suspicious votes
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Handpicked Governor −0.108∗∗∗ −0.096∗∗∗ −0.079∗∗ −0.082∗∗
(0.029) (0.030) (0.035) (0.037)
4-year ∆ Economy 0.016 0.008 0.011 0.004
(0.014) (0.015) (0.016) (0.018)
Handpicked Governor × 4-year ∆ Economy −0.047∗∗ −0.035 −0.049∗∗ −0.050∗
(0.021) (0.023) (0.025) (0.027)
Region FE Y Y Y Y
Election FE Y Y Y Y
Controls Y Y Y Y
Election × Fed.Distr. FE N Y N Y
Region FE × t N N Y Y
Regions 71 71 71 71
Observations 497 497 497 497
R2 0.790 0.821 0.853 0.873
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the region level in parantheses, ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01;
Controls: Democracy1991−2001 × Election FE
mates and their sensitivity to including the two additional fixed effect specifications
jointly and by themselves. Reassuringly, the estimates for HandpickedGovernor and
HandpickedGovernor×4-year ∆ Economy are not changing substantially in magni-
tude and remain significant. The level treatment effect increases to about -0.08 in
column 3 and 4, suggesting that the baseline estimate was slightly biased downwards
due to diverging trends. The interaction with economic performance is less precisely
estimated but remains almost identical even in the most flexible fixed effects setup
in the final column. Overall, it seems unlikely that characteristics at the federal
district level or diverging patterns in election fraud are driving the baseline results.
Another important question is the sensitivity of the baseline findings for Hand-
pickedGovernor × 4-year ∆ Economy to alternative definitions of economic per-
formance. In order to evaluate this, I investigate in table 7 the sensitivity of the
baseline results to varying time-horizons of economic performance as well as the
individual components of the index. Column 2 to 4 show that using the PCA of
changes in unemployment and log GDP per capita over time horizons closer to the
election data does not change the treatment effect. The coefficient on the interac-
tion effect HandpickedGovernor×4-year ∆ Economy, however, halves in magnitude
and loses its significance. The choice of a 4-year horizon thus seems to be a crucial
choice for finding evidence on the competence mechanism. Finally, specifications 5
27
Table 7: Sensitivity of results to definition of economic performance
Outcome variable PCA of ∆ Unemployment rate and log(GDP p.c.) over 4-year ∆ of
4 years (baseline) 3 years 2 years 1 year Unemployment rate log(GDP p.c.)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Handpicked Governor −0.108∗∗∗ −0.093∗∗∗ −0.098∗∗∗ −0.093∗∗∗ −0.071∗∗∗ −0.001
(0.029) (0.028) (0.026) (0.027) (0.026) (0.065)
∆ Economy 0.016 0.010 0.017 0.023 −0.380 0.050
(0.014) (0.013) (0.012) (0.015) (0.356) (0.061)
Handpicked Governor × ∆ Economy −0.047∗∗ −0.019 −0.028 −0.023 1.287∗∗ −0.120
(0.021) (0.024) (0.019) (0.020) (0.587) (0.085)
Region FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Election FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y
Regions 71 71 71 71 71 71
Observations 497 497 497 497 497 497
R2 0.790 0.787 0.789 0.790 0.790 0.788
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the region level in parantheses, ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01; Controls: Democracy1991−2001 × Election FE
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and 6 reveal that 4-year changes in unemployment are probably the main driver of
the baseline results, while changes in log GDP per capita over the same time period
per se do not allow reproducing these findings.
5.4 Placebo tests and related outcomes
The plausibility of the common trends assumption can also be tested through a
placebo experiment in which the treatment period is moved forward by several time
periods. In doing so, one can test whether there was a significant level difference
between treatment and control group prior to the selection of a new governor which
may have not been captured by the region-specific time trends in the preceding
section. For instance, a new law in 2001 made it possible to prosecute governors
for criminal activities (Sharafutdinova, 2010). If under-performing, to-be-removed
governors were decreasing election fraud in response to this law or any other policy
change or if fraud reduction was in fact an anticipatory behaviour, this may still
yield results similar to the baseline. Table 8 reports the initial estimates along with
two further specifications looking only at pre-2005 data where the replacement of a
governor is moved either one or two elections forward. As can be seen from column
2 and 3, this manipulation of the treatment variable halves the corresponding point
estimate of HandpickedGovernor and leaves it insignificant. The interaction with
4-year ∆ Economy loses its significance in specification 3 but flips sign and remains
highly significant in the second case. This finding can be explained by the fact that
the 2004 surge in rigging was particularly strong in the Northern Caucasus regions
such as Dagestan and North Ossetia whose governors were among the first ones to
be replaced and at the same time saw their economies recovering after the nearby
Second Chechen War 1999 to 2000. Once the 6 regions of the Northern Caucasian
Federal district are omitted, the coefficient drops and becomes insignificant (see
table A1).
One implicit assumption of this study is that election fraud in Russia between
2000 and 2012 has been mainly turnout increasing. This means that additional
votes for the advantaged candidate are generated through unused ballot sheets or
biased mobilisation of voters rather than stealing votes from other candidates or
parties. Even the vote share of the incumbent may not be affected, given reports on
specific vote targets which could be achieved by legal and non-legal means (White,
2011). Hence, one would expect turnout but not other parties to respond to having
a handpicked governor which offers another insightful placebo test. I therefore re-
estimate equation 1 using turnout and vote shares of the incumbent and other
parties (Communist, Ultranational, and Democratic) as outcomes. The findings
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Table 8: Results from placebo tests on pre-treatment data
Treatment Handpicked
Governort
Handpicked
Governort+1
Handpicked
Governort+2
(1) (2) (3)
Handpicked Governor −0.090∗∗∗ −0.062 −0.059
(0.028) (0.038) (0.049)
4-year ∆ Economy 0.009 −0.009 −0.003
(0.013) (0.017) (0.018)
Handpicked Governor × 4-year ∆ Economy −0.031 0.067∗∗ 0.020
(0.021) (0.030) (0.021)
Region FE Y Y Y
Election FE Y Y Y
Controls Y Y Y
Sample 2000–2012 2000–2004 2000–2004
Regions 69 69 69
Observations 483 207 207
R2 0.790 0.849 0.847
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the region level in parantheses, ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01;
Controls: Democracy1991−2001 × Election FE
presented in table 8 are roughly in line with the assumption of turnout increasing
election rigging. Turnout in column 2 is decreasing by 2% on average in regions with
an appointed governor, significant at the 10% level. The marginal effect turns even
more negative depending on economic performance but is not statistically significant.
The effect on incumbent vote share in specification 3 yields qualitatively similar
but insignificant results. For the remaining parties, both the HandpickedGovernor
and HandpickedGovernor×4-year ∆ Economy coefficients are far smaller and never
significant. The coefficients on 4-year ∆ Economy indicate that, even in the presence
of large-scale fraud, voters may hold the central government accountable to some
extent and give their votes to opposition parties if their economic situation worsens.
An effect of having a handpicked governor on vote shares of the incumbent or any
other party can, however, not be found.
In sum, the results of section 5.2 have proven stable throughout a number of
robustness and falsification checks. The interaction with regional economic growth
has, however, turned out slightly less stable and appears to depend strongly on the
time dimension used to construct the principal components.
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Table 9: Results for different election outcomes
Dependent variable Share
suspicious
votes
% Turnout % Incumbent % Communist % Ultra-
national
(LDPR)
% Democratic
(Yabloko)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Handpicked Governor −0.108∗∗∗ −0.020∗ −0.013 0.006 −0.005 0.004
(0.029) (0.011) (0.013) (0.007) (0.003) (0.002)
4-year ∆ Economy 0.016 0.005 0.022∗∗∗ −0.013∗∗∗ −0.002∗ 0.000
(0.014) (0.004) (0.005) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002)
Handpicked Governor × 4-year ∆ Economy −0.047∗∗ −0.012 −0.010 0.004 −0.003 0.000
(0.021) (0.013) (0.012) (0.006) (0.003) (0.003)
Region FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Election FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y
Regions 71 71 71 71 71 71
Observations 497 497 497 497 497 497
R2 0.790 0.825 0.894 0.857 0.898 0.860
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the region level in parantheses, ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01; Controls: Democracy1991−2001 × Election FE
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6 Conclusion
In this paper, I study the importance of incentive structures of local officials on the
dynamics of election fraud in Russia. I exploit a radical law change in December 2004
which allowed the central government to remove governors without any constraints
and thus created strong motivation for the latter to use rigging in order to stay
in office. Hypotheses from a simple conceptual framework predict that governors
handpicked by the central government have less need to engage in fraud than elected
(and not yet replaced) ones since their loyalty is assured. Handpicked governors on
the other hand are assumed to respond with rigging in the face a bad economic
performance and lower expected votes. The paper develops and extensively tests a
new indicator of electoral fraud for Russian regions between 2000 and 2012 which
is created from a unique micro-level dataset of election results at the voting station
level.
The effect of having a handpicked governor on the share of suspicious votes in a
region is estimated using a differences-in-differences estimation. The baseline results
support the hypotheses and showed that regions with a handpicked governor have on
average 10% less suspicious votes than those with elected ones. Furthermore, also
the interaction of the treatment variable with economic performance is negative
and indicates that in the case of a very bad economic performance the extent of
fraud by handpicked governors would be equal to that of elected ones. In this
sense, loyalty and competence can be regarded as complementary. Both effects were
highly significant and passes several robustness checks concerning the validity of the
common trends assumption and placebo treatments. While the share of suspicious
votes is affected by the law change and handpicked governors, I also show that
election outcomes of the incumbent as well as other parties did not respond. In
other words, the incentive structures of governors does not change the results of
elections, but only the way they are generated.
Despite focussing only on the case of Russia, the findings provide interesting
insights into the functioning of competitive authoritarian systems in general. Unlike
in a totalitarian system, elections can actually still function as an arena for political
competition, albeit only among lower-tier officials. Contrary to common knowledge,
I show conceptually and empirically that rigging is far less common among the
dictator’s cronies due to their certain loyalty. From a policy perspective, this means
that advocating for the co-optation of non-cadres to government positions in an
authoritarian regime may actually have counter-productive results and lead to higher
32
levels of election fraud. Also the fact that bad economic performance induces even
higher levels of election fraud should be born in mind when deciding about sanctions.
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A Tables
Table A1: Results from placebo tests on pre-treatment data (omitting Northern
Caucasus district)
Treatment Handpicked
Governort
Handpicked
Governort+1
Handpicked
Governort+2
(1) (2) (3)
Handpicked Governor −0.069∗∗ −0.050 −0.044
(0.027) (0.041) (0.048)
4-year ∆ Economy 0.021 −0.002 0.003
(0.014) (0.020) (0.021)
Handpicked Governor × 4-year ∆ Economy −0.013 0.052 0.009
(0.020) (0.036) (0.023)
Region FE Y Y Y
Election FE Y Y Y
Controls Y Y Y
Sample 2000–2012 2000–2004 2000–2004
Regions 65 65 65
Observations 455 195 195
R2 0.801 0.867 0.866
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the region level in parantheses, ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01;
Controls: Democracy1991−2001 × Election FE
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